Document Actions
Citation and Metadata
Recommended citation
Hansen A, Joseph K, Krafft M (2008). Price Delegation in Sales Organizations: An Empirical Investigation. BuR - Business Research, Vol. 1, Iss. 1, pp. 94-104, URN: urn:nbn:de:0009-20-13948
Download Citation
Endnote
%0 Journal Article %T Price Delegation in Sales Organizations: An Empirical Investigation %A Hansen, Ann-Kristin %A Joseph, Kissan %A Krafft, Manfred %J BuR - Business Research %D 2008 %V 1 %N 1 %@ 1866-8658 %F hansen2008 %X The allocation of decision rights is an integral component of designing organizational architecture. Economists have long understood the importance of co-locating decision rights with the knowledge that is valuable to those decisions. Following this prescription, marketing scholars have developed strong theoretical arguments in favor of delegating pricing authority to the sales force. Empirical work, however, reveals a significant number of sales organizations yielding only minimal authority to their salespeople. Given this divergence between theory and practice, we develop and empirically test two mitigating factors that could potentially explain why firms restrict pricing authority. We test our hypotheses on a sample of 222 German sales organizations and find that the data are generally consistent with our conceptualization. %L 330 %K pricing authority %K delegation %K determinants of price delegation %K pricing %K sales force management %U http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0009-20-13948 %P 94-104
Bibtex
@Article{hansen2008,
author = "Hansen, Ann-Kristin
and Joseph, Kissan
and Krafft, Manfred",
title = "Price Delegation in Sales Organizations: An Empirical Investigation",
journal = "BuR - Business Research",
year = "2008",
volume = "1",
number = "1",
pages = "94--104",
keywords = "pricing authority",
keywords = "delegation",
keywords = "determinants of price delegation",
keywords = "pricing",
keywords = "sales force management",
abstract = "The allocation of decision rights is an integral component of designing organizational architecture. Economists have long understood the importance of co-locating decision rights with the knowledge that is valuable to those decisions. Following this prescription, marketing scholars have developed strong theoretical arguments in favor of delegating pricing authority to the sales force. Empirical work, however, reveals a significant number of sales organizations yielding only minimal authority to their salespeople. Given this divergence between theory and practice, we develop and empirically test two mitigating factors that could potentially explain why firms restrict pricing authority. We test our hypotheses on a sample of 222 German sales organizations and find that the data are generally consistent with our conceptualization.",
issn = "1866-8658",
url = "http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0009-20-13948"
}
RIS
TY - JOUR AU - Hansen, Ann-Kristin AU - Joseph, Kissan AU - Krafft, Manfred PY - 2008// TI - Price Delegation in Sales Organizations: An Empirical Investigation JO - BuR - Business Research SP - 94 EP - 104 VL - 1 IS - 1 KW - pricing authority KW - delegation KW - determinants of price delegation KW - pricing KW - sales force management N2 - The allocation of decision rights is an integral component of designing organizational architecture. Economists have long understood the importance of co-locating decision rights with the knowledge that is valuable to those decisions. Following this prescription, marketing scholars have developed strong theoretical arguments in favor of delegating pricing authority to the sales force. Empirical work, however, reveals a significant number of sales organizations yielding only minimal authority to their salespeople. Given this divergence between theory and practice, we develop and empirically test two mitigating factors that could potentially explain why firms restrict pricing authority. We test our hypotheses on a sample of 222 German sales organizations and find that the data are generally consistent with our conceptualization. SN - 1866-8658 UR - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0009-20-13948 ID - hansen2008 ER -
Wordbib
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <b:Sources SelectedStyle="" xmlns:b="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/bibliography" xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/bibliography" > <b:Source> <b:Tag>hansen2008</b:Tag> <b:SourceType>ArticleInAPeriodical</b:SourceType> <b:Year>2008</b:Year> <b:PeriodicalName>BuR - Business Research</b:PeriodicalName> <b:Volume>1</b:Volume> <b:Issue>1</b:Issue> <b:Pages>94-104</b:Pages> <b:Author> <b:Author><b:NameList> <b:Person><b:Last>Hansen</b:Last><b:First>Ann-Kristin</b:First></b:Person> <b:Person><b:Last>Joseph</b:Last><b:First>Kissan</b:First></b:Person> <b:Person><b:Last>Krafft</b:Last><b:First>Manfred</b:First></b:Person> </b:NameList></b:Author> </b:Author> <b:Title>Price Delegation in Sales Organizations: An Empirical Investigation</b:Title> <b:Comments>The allocation of decision rights is an integral component of designing organizational architecture. Economists have long understood the importance of co-locating decision rights with the knowledge that is valuable to those decisions. Following this prescription, marketing scholars have developed strong theoretical arguments in favor of delegating pricing authority to the sales force. Empirical work, however, reveals a significant number of sales organizations yielding only minimal authority to their salespeople. Given this divergence between theory and practice, we develop and empirically test two mitigating factors that could potentially explain why firms restrict pricing authority. We test our hypotheses on a sample of 222 German sales organizations and find that the data are generally consistent with our conceptualization.</b:Comments> </b:Source> </b:Sources>
ISI
PT Journal AU Hansen, A Joseph, K Krafft, M TI Price Delegation in Sales Organizations: An Empirical Investigation SO BuR - Business Research PY 2008 BP 94 EP 104 VL 1 IS 1 DE pricing authority; delegation; determinants of price delegation; pricing; sales force management AB The allocation of decision rights is an integral component of designing organizational architecture. Economists have long understood the importance of co-locating decision rights with the knowledge that is valuable to those decisions. Following this prescription, marketing scholars have developed strong theoretical arguments in favor of delegating pricing authority to the sales force. Empirical work, however, reveals a significant number of sales organizations yielding only minimal authority to their salespeople. Given this divergence between theory and practice, we develop and empirically test two mitigating factors that could potentially explain why firms restrict pricing authority. We test our hypotheses on a sample of 222 German sales organizations and find that the data are generally consistent with our conceptualization. ER
Mods
<mods>
<titleInfo>
<title>Price Delegation in Sales Organizations: An Empirical Investigation</title>
</titleInfo>
<name type="personal">
<namePart type="family">Hansen</namePart>
<namePart type="given">Ann-Kristin</namePart>
</name>
<name type="personal">
<namePart type="family">Joseph</namePart>
<namePart type="given">Kissan</namePart>
</name>
<name type="personal">
<namePart type="family">Krafft</namePart>
<namePart type="given">Manfred</namePart>
</name>
<abstract>The allocation of decision rights is an integral component of designing organizational architecture. Economists have long understood the importance of co-locating decision rights with the knowledge that is valuable to those decisions. Following this prescription, marketing scholars have developed strong theoretical arguments in favor of delegating pricing authority to the sales force. Empirical work, however, reveals a significant number of sales organizations yielding only minimal authority to their salespeople. Given this divergence between theory and practice, we develop and empirically test two mitigating factors that could potentially explain why firms restrict pricing authority. We test our hypotheses on a sample of 222 German sales organizations and find that the data are generally consistent with our conceptualization.</abstract>
<subject>
<topic>pricing authority</topic>
<topic>delegation</topic>
<topic>determinants of price delegation</topic>
<topic>pricing</topic>
<topic>sales force management</topic>
</subject>
<classification authority="ddc">330</classification>
<relatedItem type="host">
<genre authority="marcgt">periodical</genre>
<genre>academic journal</genre>
<titleInfo>
<title>BuR - Business Research</title>
</titleInfo>
<part>
<detail type="volume">
<number>1</number>
</detail>
<detail type="issue">
<number>1</number>
</detail>
<date>2008</date>
<extent unit="page">
<start>94</start>
<end>104</end>
</extent>
</part>
</relatedItem>
<identifier type="issn">1866-8658</identifier>
<identifier type="urn">urn:nbn:de:0009-20-13948</identifier>
<identifier type="uri">http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0009-20-13948</identifier>
<identifier type="citekey">hansen2008</identifier>
</mods>
Full Metadata
| Bibliographic Citation | BuR - Business Research, Vol. 1, Iss. 1, pp. 94-104 |
|---|---|
| Title | Price Delegation in Sales Organizations: An Empirical Investigation (eng) |
| Author | Ann-Kristin Hansen, Kissan Joseph, Manfred Krafft |
| Language | eng |
| Abstract | The allocation of decision rights is an integral component of designing organizational architecture. Economists have long understood the importance of co-locating decision rights with the knowledge that is valuable to those decisions. Following this prescription, marketing scholars have developed strong theoretical arguments in favor of delegating pricing authority to the sales force. Empirical work, however, reveals a significant number of sales organizations yielding only minimal authority to their salespeople. Given this divergence between theory and practice, we develop and empirically test two mitigating factors that could potentially explain why firms restrict pricing authority. We test our hypotheses on a sample of 222 German sales organizations and find that the data are generally consistent with our conceptualization. |
| Subject | pricing authority, delegation, determinants of price delegation, pricing, sales force management |
| DDC | 330 |
| Rights | authorcontract |
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:0009-20-13948 |
