Document Actions
Citation and Metadata
Recommended citation
Hofmann C (2008). Earnings Management and Measurement Error. BuR - Business Research, Vol. 1, Iss. 2, pp. 149-163, URN: urn:nbn:de:0009-20-16509
Download Citation
Endnote
%0 Journal Article %T Earnings Management and Measurement Error %A Hofmann, Christian %J BuR - Business Research %D 2008 %V 1 %N 2 %@ 1866-8658 %F hofmann2008 %X In this paper I consider the impact of a noisy indicator regarding a manager’s manipulative behavior on optimal effort incentives and the extent of earnings management. The analysis in this paper extends a twotask, single performance measure LEN model by including a binary random variable. I show that contracting on the noisy indicator variable is not always useful. More specifically, the principal uses the indicator variable to prevent earnings management only under conditions where manipulative behavior is not excessive. Thus, under conditions of excessive earnings management, accounting adjustments that yield a more congruent overall performance measure can be more effective than an appraisal of the existence of earnings management to mitigate the earnings management problem. %L 330 %K accounting %U http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0009-20-16509 %P 149-163
Bibtex
@Article{hofmann2008,
author = "Hofmann, Christian",
title = "Earnings Management and Measurement Error",
journal = "BuR - Business Research",
year = "2008",
volume = "1",
number = "2",
pages = "149--163",
keywords = "accounting",
abstract = "In this paper I consider the impact of a noisy indicator regarding a manager's manipulative behavior on optimal effort incentives and the extent of earnings management. The analysis in this paper extends a twotask, single performance measure LEN model by including a binary random variable. I show that contracting on the noisy indicator variable is not always useful. More specifically, the principal uses the indicator variable to prevent earnings management only under conditions where manipulative behavior is not excessive. Thus, under conditions of excessive earnings management, accounting adjustments that yield a more congruent overall performance measure can be more effective than an appraisal of the existence of earnings management to mitigate the earnings management problem.",
issn = "1866-8658",
url = "http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0009-20-16509"
}
RIS
TY - JOUR AU - Hofmann, Christian PY - 2008// TI - Earnings Management and Measurement Error JO - BuR - Business Research SP - 149 EP - 163 VL - 1 IS - 2 KW - accounting N2 - In this paper I consider the impact of a noisy indicator regarding a manager’s manipulative behavior on optimal effort incentives and the extent of earnings management. The analysis in this paper extends a twotask, single performance measure LEN model by including a binary random variable. I show that contracting on the noisy indicator variable is not always useful. More specifically, the principal uses the indicator variable to prevent earnings management only under conditions where manipulative behavior is not excessive. Thus, under conditions of excessive earnings management, accounting adjustments that yield a more congruent overall performance measure can be more effective than an appraisal of the existence of earnings management to mitigate the earnings management problem. SN - 1866-8658 UR - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0009-20-16509 ID - hofmann2008 ER -
Wordbib
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <b:Sources SelectedStyle="" xmlns:b="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/bibliography" xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/bibliography" > <b:Source> <b:Tag>hofmann2008</b:Tag> <b:SourceType>ArticleInAPeriodical</b:SourceType> <b:Year>2008</b:Year> <b:PeriodicalName>BuR - Business Research</b:PeriodicalName> <b:Volume>1</b:Volume> <b:Issue>2</b:Issue> <b:Pages>149-163</b:Pages> <b:Author> <b:Author><b:NameList> <b:Person><b:Last>Hofmann</b:Last><b:First>Christian</b:First></b:Person> </b:NameList></b:Author> </b:Author> <b:Title>Earnings Management and Measurement Error</b:Title> <b:Comments>In this paper I consider the impact of a noisy indicator regarding a manager’s manipulative behavior on optimal effort incentives and the extent of earnings management. The analysis in this paper extends a twotask, single performance measure LEN model by including a binary random variable. I show that contracting on the noisy indicator variable is not always useful. More specifically, the principal uses the indicator variable to prevent earnings management only under conditions where manipulative behavior is not excessive. Thus, under conditions of excessive earnings management, accounting adjustments that yield a more congruent overall performance measure can be more effective than an appraisal of the existence of earnings management to mitigate the earnings management problem.</b:Comments> </b:Source> </b:Sources>
ISI
PT Journal AU Hofmann, C TI Earnings Management and Measurement Error SO BuR - Business Research PY 2008 BP 149 EP 163 VL 1 IS 2 DE accounting AB In this paper I consider the impact of a noisy indicator regarding a manager’s manipulative behavior on optimal effort incentives and the extent of earnings management. The analysis in this paper extends a twotask, single performance measure LEN model by including a binary random variable. I show that contracting on the noisy indicator variable is not always useful. More specifically, the principal uses the indicator variable to prevent earnings management only under conditions where manipulative behavior is not excessive. Thus, under conditions of excessive earnings management, accounting adjustments that yield a more congruent overall performance measure can be more effective than an appraisal of the existence of earnings management to mitigate the earnings management problem. ER
Mods
<mods>
<titleInfo>
<title>Earnings Management and Measurement Error</title>
</titleInfo>
<name type="personal">
<namePart type="family">Hofmann</namePart>
<namePart type="given">Christian</namePart>
</name>
<abstract>In this paper I consider the impact of a noisy indicator regarding a manager’s manipulative behavior on optimal effort incentives and the extent of earnings management. The analysis in this paper extends a twotask, single performance measure LEN model by including a binary random variable. I show that contracting on the noisy indicator variable is not always useful. More specifically, the principal uses the indicator variable to prevent earnings management only under conditions where manipulative behavior is not excessive. Thus, under conditions of excessive earnings management, accounting adjustments that yield a more congruent overall performance measure can be more effective than an appraisal of the existence of earnings management to mitigate the earnings management problem.</abstract>
<subject>
<topic>accounting</topic>
</subject>
<classification authority="ddc">330</classification>
<relatedItem type="host">
<genre authority="marcgt">periodical</genre>
<genre>academic journal</genre>
<titleInfo>
<title>BuR - Business Research</title>
</titleInfo>
<part>
<detail type="volume">
<number>1</number>
</detail>
<detail type="issue">
<number>2</number>
</detail>
<date>2008</date>
<extent unit="page">
<start>149</start>
<end>163</end>
</extent>
</part>
</relatedItem>
<identifier type="issn">1866-8658</identifier>
<identifier type="urn">urn:nbn:de:0009-20-16509</identifier>
<identifier type="uri">http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0009-20-16509</identifier>
<identifier type="citekey">hofmann2008</identifier>
</mods>
Full Metadata
| Bibliographic Citation | BuR - Business Research, Vol. 1, Iss. 2, pp. 149-163 |
|---|---|
| Title | Earnings Management and Measurement Error (eng) |
| Author | Christian Hofmann |
| Language | eng |
| Abstract | In this paper I consider the impact of a noisy indicator regarding a manager’s manipulative behavior on optimal effort incentives and the extent of earnings management. The analysis in this paper extends a twotask, single performance measure LEN model by including a binary random variable. I show that contracting on the noisy indicator variable is not always useful. More specifically, the principal uses the indicator variable to prevent earnings management only under conditions where manipulative behavior is not excessive. Thus, under conditions of excessive earnings management, accounting adjustments that yield a more congruent overall performance measure can be more effective than an appraisal of the existence of earnings management to mitigate the earnings management problem. |
| Subject | accounting |
| DDC | 330 |
| Rights | authorcontract |
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:0009-20-16509 |
