Document Actions
Citation and Metadata
Recommended citation
Dymke BM, Walter A (2008). Insider Trading in Germany - Do Corporate Insiders Exploit Inside Information?. BuR - Business Research, Vol. 1, Iss. 2, pp. 188-205, URN: urn:nbn:de:0009-20-16524
Download Citation
Endnote
%0 Journal Article %T Insider Trading in Germany - Do Corporate Insiders Exploit Inside Information? %A Dymke, M. Björn %A Walter, Andreas %J BuR - Business Research %D 2008 %V 1 %N 2 %@ 1866-8658 %F dymke2008 %X Our study focuses on the question whether corporate insiders in Germany exploit inside information whiletrading in their company’s stock. In contrast to prior international studies, which are not able to link insidertransactions to a formal definition of inside information, we relate insider transactions to subsequent releases of inside information via ad-hoc news disclosures. We find evidence that corporate insiders as a group seem to trade on inside information. Moreover, members of the supervisory board seem to be most active in exploiting inside information, since they realize exceptionally high profits with their frequent front-running transactions. %L 330 %K finance %U http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0009-20-16524 %P 188-205
Bibtex
@Article{dymke2008,
author = "Dymke, M. Bj{\"o}rn
and Walter, Andreas",
title = "Insider Trading in Germany - Do Corporate Insiders Exploit Inside Information?",
journal = "BuR - Business Research",
year = "2008",
volume = "1",
number = "2",
pages = "188--205",
keywords = "finance",
abstract = "Our study focuses on the question whether corporate insiders in Germany exploit inside information whiletrading in their company's stock. In contrast to prior international studies, which are not able to link insidertransactions to a formal definition of inside information, we relate insider transactions to subsequent releases of inside information via ad-hoc news disclosures. We find evidence that corporate insiders as a group seem to trade on inside information. Moreover, members of the supervisory board seem to be most active in exploiting inside information, since they realize exceptionally high profits with their frequent front-running transactions.",
issn = "1866-8658",
url = "http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0009-20-16524"
}
RIS
TY - JOUR AU - Dymke, M. Björn AU - Walter, Andreas PY - 2008// TI - Insider Trading in Germany - Do Corporate Insiders Exploit Inside Information? JO - BuR - Business Research SP - 188 EP - 205 VL - 1 IS - 2 KW - finance N2 - Our study focuses on the question whether corporate insiders in Germany exploit inside information whiletrading in their company’s stock. In contrast to prior international studies, which are not able to link insidertransactions to a formal definition of inside information, we relate insider transactions to subsequent releases of inside information via ad-hoc news disclosures. We find evidence that corporate insiders as a group seem to trade on inside information. Moreover, members of the supervisory board seem to be most active in exploiting inside information, since they realize exceptionally high profits with their frequent front-running transactions. SN - 1866-8658 UR - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0009-20-16524 ID - dymke2008 ER -
Wordbib
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <b:Sources SelectedStyle="" xmlns:b="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/bibliography" xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/bibliography" > <b:Source> <b:Tag>dymke2008</b:Tag> <b:SourceType>ArticleInAPeriodical</b:SourceType> <b:Year>2008</b:Year> <b:PeriodicalName>BuR - Business Research</b:PeriodicalName> <b:Volume>1</b:Volume> <b:Issue>2</b:Issue> <b:Pages>188-205</b:Pages> <b:Author> <b:Author><b:NameList> <b:Person><b:Last>Dymke</b:Last><b:First>M.</b:First><b:Middle>Björn</b:Middle></b:Person> <b:Person><b:Last>Walter</b:Last><b:First>Andreas</b:First></b:Person> </b:NameList></b:Author> </b:Author> <b:Title>Insider Trading in Germany - Do Corporate Insiders Exploit Inside Information?</b:Title> <b:Comments>Our study focuses on the question whether corporate insiders in Germany exploit inside information whiletrading in their company’s stock. In contrast to prior international studies, which are not able to link insidertransactions to a formal definition of inside information, we relate insider transactions to subsequent releases of inside information via ad-hoc news disclosures. We find evidence that corporate insiders as a group seem to trade on inside information. Moreover, members of the supervisory board seem to be most active in exploiting inside information, since they realize exceptionally high profits with their frequent front-running transactions.</b:Comments> </b:Source> </b:Sources>
ISI
PT Journal AU Dymke, MB Walter, A TI Insider Trading in Germany - Do Corporate Insiders Exploit Inside Information? SO BuR - Business Research PY 2008 BP 188 EP 205 VL 1 IS 2 DE finance AB Our study focuses on the question whether corporate insiders in Germany exploit inside information whiletrading in their company’s stock. In contrast to prior international studies, which are not able to link insidertransactions to a formal definition of inside information, we relate insider transactions to subsequent releases of inside information via ad-hoc news disclosures. We find evidence that corporate insiders as a group seem to trade on inside information. Moreover, members of the supervisory board seem to be most active in exploiting inside information, since they realize exceptionally high profits with their frequent front-running transactions. ER
Mods
<mods>
<titleInfo>
<title>Insider Trading in Germany - Do Corporate Insiders Exploit Inside Information?</title>
</titleInfo>
<name type="personal">
<namePart type="family">Dymke</namePart>
<namePart type="given">Björn M.</namePart>
</name>
<name type="personal">
<namePart type="family">Walter</namePart>
<namePart type="given">Andreas</namePart>
</name>
<abstract>Our study focuses on the question whether corporate insiders in Germany exploit inside information while
trading in their company’s stock. In contrast to prior international studies, which are not able to link insider
transactions to a formal definition of inside information, we relate insider transactions to subsequent releases of inside information via ad-hoc news disclosures. We find evidence that corporate insiders as a group seem to trade on inside information. Moreover, members of the supervisory board seem to be most active in exploiting inside information, since they realize exceptionally high profits with their frequent front-running transactions.</abstract>
<subject>
<topic>finance</topic>
</subject>
<classification authority="ddc">330</classification>
<relatedItem type="host">
<genre authority="marcgt">periodical</genre>
<genre>academic journal</genre>
<titleInfo>
<title>BuR - Business Research</title>
</titleInfo>
<part>
<detail type="volume">
<number>1</number>
</detail>
<detail type="issue">
<number>2</number>
</detail>
<date>2008</date>
<extent unit="page">
<start>188</start>
<end>205</end>
</extent>
</part>
</relatedItem>
<identifier type="issn">1866-8658</identifier>
<identifier type="urn">urn:nbn:de:0009-20-16524</identifier>
<identifier type="uri">http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0009-20-16524</identifier>
<identifier type="citekey">dymke2008</identifier>
</mods>
Full Metadata
| Bibliographic Citation | BuR - Business Research, Vol. 1, Iss. 2, pp. 188-205 |
|---|---|
| Title | Insider Trading in Germany - Do Corporate Insiders Exploit Inside Information? (eng) |
| Author | Björn M. Dymke, Andreas Walter |
| Language | eng |
| Abstract | Our study focuses on the question whether corporate insiders in Germany exploit inside information while trading in their company’s stock. In contrast to prior international studies, which are not able to link insider transactions to a formal definition of inside information, we relate insider transactions to subsequent releases of inside information via ad-hoc news disclosures. We find evidence that corporate insiders as a group seem to trade on inside information. Moreover, members of the supervisory board seem to be most active in exploiting inside information, since they realize exceptionally high profits with their frequent front-running transactions. |
| Subject | finance |
| DDC | 330 |
| Rights | authorcontract |
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:0009-20-16524 |
